La exploración sobre la naturaleza, el significado y la estructura del concepto de crisis, y la definición misma de una crisis social convocan, primero, al uso, por lo general, ambiguo del término y, segundo, a las condiciones que manifiesta el mundo contemporáneo. Así, en este libro se procura analizar el, popularmente empleado pero poco esclarecido, concepto de crisis, sobre todo, en dos autores de la segunda generación de la teoría crítica, Habermas y Offe. La intención fundamental del texto es crear, (...) a partir de estos autores, un enfoque para estudiar las dinámicas patológicas de las sociedades contemporáneas. (shrink)

La Psicología de la Sustentabilidad (PS) estudia las problemáticas hídricas considerando la relación entre disponibilidad per cápita y consumo de agua. A partir de conceptos tales como; densidad poblacional, infraestructura hídrica y provisión de agua plantea tres estilos de vida relativos al almacenamiento de agua, la reparación de fugas y el consumo hídrico. La PS advierte que las relaciones causales entre las problemáticas hídricas y los estilos de vida son relevantes si se considera el Desarrollo Local Sustentable más que regional (...) y global. A medida que las problemáticas hídricas se intensifican, procesos actitudinales y de austeridad prevalecen sobre el dispendio de agua. En contraste, las situaciones hídricas en equilibrio con el consumo residencial facilitan el dispendio. La discusión alusiva a las problemáticas hídricas y los estilos de vida permitirá construir un sistema tarifario de consumo y delimitar las políticas públicas que se requerirán en el marco de la crisis de abastecimiento y distribución que se espera en los próximos años. (shrink)

The question I address in this paper is whether and under what conditions it is morally right to bring a person into existence. I defend the commonsensical thesis that, other things being equal, it is morally wrong to create a person who will be below some threshold of quality of life, even if the life of this potential person, once created, will nevertheless be worth living. However commonsensical this view might seem, it has shown to be problematic because of the (...) so-called 'Non-Identity Problem'. Both utilitarian and rights-based approaches have been unable to provide a solution to this problem. I rest my thesis on two premises: that causing a disability or impairment in a future person is prima facie wrong, so long as we can avoid causing such a disability to that very person; and that reproduction, under normal conditions, is prima facie morally indifferent. From these two premises, I conclude that it is prima facie wrong to bring into existence a person with a non-trivial disability or impairment (which might be, nonetheless, compatible with a worthwhile life), even if the only available alternative is to remain childless. (shrink)

Most people (and philosophers) distinguish between performing a morally wrong action and being blameworthy for having performed that action, and believe that an individual can be fully excused for having performed a wrong action. My purpose is to reject this claim. More precisely, I defend what I call the “Dependence Claim”: A's doing X is wrong only if A is blameworthy for having done X. I consider three cases in which, according to the traditional view, a wrong action could be (...) excused: duress, mental illness, and mistake. I try to show that the reasons for excusing in either case are not relevantly distinguishable from the reasons for claiming that the prima facie wrong action is not wrong all things considered. (shrink)

In this article I explore a kind of tragic choice that has not received due attention, one in which you have to save only one of two persons but the probability of saving is not equal (and all other things are equal). Different proposals are assessed, taking as models proposals for a much more discussed tragic choice situation: saving different numbers of persons. I hold that cases in which (only) numbers are different are structurally similar to cases in which (only) (...) probabilities are different. After a brief defense of this claim, I conclude that some version of consequentialism seems more promising for offering a plausible solution to the probability case. (shrink)

From March to September 2020, researchers working at a biomedical scientific campus in Spain faced two lockdowns and various mobility restrictions that affected their social and professional lifestyles. The working group “Women in Science,” which acts as an independent observatory of scientific gender inequalities on campus launched an online survey to assess the impact of COVID-19 lockdowns on scientific activity, domestic and caregiving tasks, and psychological status. The survey revealed differences in scientific performance by gender: while male researchers participated in (...) a larger number of scientific activities for career development, female researchers performed more invisible scientific tasks, including peer review or outreach activities. Mental impact was greater in researchers caring for children or dependents, and this was aggravated for women. Results spot a disproportionate impact of COVID-19 lockdowns on female scientific career development, and urges for equity measures to mitigate the consequences of an increase in the gender gap in biomedical sciences for current and future pandemics. (shrink)

We all agree on the justification of defending ourselves or others in some situations, but we do not often agree on why. Two main views compete: subjectivism and objectivism. The discussion has mainly been held in normative terms. But every theory must pass a previous test: logical consistency. It has recently been held that, at least in the case of defending others from aggression, objective theories lead, in some situations, to normative contradiction. My aim is to challenge the idea that (...) only objective theories have this uncomfortable feature. In fact, any plausible theory justifying the defense of others, whether subjectively or objectively, can lead to situations of normative inconsistency. Therefore, the logical test is not the most fitting one for choosing between different theories of private defense. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to provide an effective counterexample to consequentialism. I assume that traditional counterexamples, such as Transplant (A doctor should kill one person and transplant her organs to five terminal patients, thereby saving their lives) and Judge (A judge should sentence to death an innocent person if he knows that an outraged mob will otherwise kill many innocent persons), are not effective, for two reasons: first, they make unrealistic assumptions and, second, they do not pass the (...) rule‐consequentialist institutional test. My example (The Moral Murderer), instead, assumes a realistic empirical framework and the relevant action does not undermine basic social institutions. On the contrary, it reinforces them. In The Moral Murderer, Tom (an adult male) is morally allowed to murder a person (preferably a woman) in order to be punished to death. (shrink)

The question I address in this paper is whether there is a version of mental state welfarism that can be coherent with the thesis that we have a legitimate concern for non‐experiential goals. If there is not, then we should reject mental state welfarism. My thesis is that there is such a version. My argument relies on the distinction between “reality‐centered desires” and “experience‐centered desires”. Mental state welfarism can accommodate our reality‐centered desires and our desire that they be objectively satisfied. (...) My general strategy is, at the level of the value theory, somewhat analogous to the strategy that indirect consequentialism applies at the level of moral obligation theory. To test my argument, I appeal to Nozick's well‐known example of the Experience Machine. (shrink)

This article discusses what could be called “the adventure of translating” Sein und Zeit in Spanish. It argues that every translation is an adventure, and particularly the translation of a philosophical text. A translation does not literally reproduce into another language what an author or philosopher affirms. The question is instead to express it in the most accurate form with the resources of the translator’s language, in such a way that the text may sound as if it was written in (...) the language to which it is to be translated. This article refers to the very long route that the author had to go over in order to make Sein und Zeit “speak” a good and clear Spanish. (shrink)

Peirce’s idea of an unlimited community has been usually analyzed from its role in science and the normative ideal of truth. However, it is essential to understand the role of the community of inquiry in light of the other normative sciences, aesthetics and ethics, since according to Peirce, any endeavor to know that is not guided by the esthetical ideal of admirable per se should not be considered as proper science, but as a power tool to benefit some elite. This (...) article aims to analyze Peirce’s idea of community of inquiry in light of sentimentalism and the normative sciences in order to evidence that such community is not elitist, but open, insofar as it is also lured by the summum bonum and the admirable per se. Finally, we provide a more organic reading of Peirce’s work, opening the way to consider possible consequences of this position from an ethical and political perspective. (shrink)

Nozick's well-known Experience Machine argument can be considered a typically successful argument: as far as I know, it has not been discussed much and has been widely seen as conclusive, or at least convincing enough to refute the mental-state versions of utilitarianism. I believe that if his argument were conclusive, its destructive effect would be even stronger. It would not only refute mental-state utilitarianism, but all theories considering a certain subjective mental state as the only valuable state. I shall call (...) these theories "mental state welfarist theories." I do not know whether utilitarianism or, in general, mental-state welfarism is plausible, but I doubt that Nozick's argument is strong enough to prove that it is not. (shrink)

In this article we are concerned with an analysis of the modern crisis of democracy. This aim should be pursued through the related works of Alexis de Tocqueville and Max Weber. The study begins with the claim that both authors, not only are concerned with the analysis of the rising mass democracy, but furthermore they outline the main tendencies of this new form of society. On the one hand, there is a proclivity of the contemporary systems to enter into what (...) could be denominated «individualist despotism». On the other hand, the underpinning of the plebiscitary democracy runs through an increasing «bureaucratization», which remains on the intensive process of instrumental rationality. (shrink)

I try to show that Steiner's theory has very implausible normative consequences since it does not accept the prima facie character or rights. This theory is unable to solve the conflicts of interests in which the only intuitively plausible solution consists in overriding someone's rights.

The question I address in this article is whether it is morally wrong for a lawyer to represent a client whose purpose is immoral or unjust. My answer to this question is that it is wrong, prima facie. This conclusion holds, even accepting certain traditional principles of lawyer's professional ethics, such as the right of defence and the so-called principle of ‘adversarial’ litigation. Both the adversarial system and the right of defence are sufficient to support or justify the right of (...) potential clients to defend their interests in the judicial system and to do so with the technical assistance of a lawyer. This right includes a right to pursue unjust or immoral purposes. However, having a right to do X does not mean that it is morally permissible to do X. We can have a right to do something morally wrong. This being so, the fundamental moral reason for a lawyer not to accept representation for a client with an immoral purpose is that it is, prima facie, morally wrong to help someone do something wrong. (shrink)

abstract The possibility that organ sales by living adults might be made legal is morally distressing to many of us. However, powerful arguments have been provided recently supporting legalisation (I consider two of those arguments: the Consequentialist Argument and the Autonomy Argument). Is our instinctive reaction against a market of organs irrational then? The aim of this paper is not to prove that legalization would be immoral, all things considered, but rather to show, first, that there are some kinds of (...) arguments, offered in favour of legalisation, that are, in an important sense, illegitimate, and second, that even if legalisation might not be wrong all things considered, there are good reasons for our negative moral intuitions. Moreover, identifying these reasons will help highlight some features of moral decisions in non‐ideal situations, which in turn might be relevant to some other moral or policy choices. (shrink)

We draw from upper echelons theory to investigate whether the presence of a chief sustainability officer (CSO) is associated with better corporate environmental performance in highly polluting industries. Such firms are under strong pressure to remediate environmental damage, to comply with regulations, and to even exceed environmental standards. CSOs in these firms are likely to be hired as legitimate agents to lead and successfully implement environmental strategy aimed at reducing pollution levels. Interestingly and contrary to our expectations, we found that (...) the presence of a CSO is associated with higher levels of pollution emissions. Nonetheless, we found that the CSO has a positive influence on a firm’s environmental performance if faced with strict environmental regulations. We argue that the enforcement of environmental regulations enhances monitoring and accountability of pollution emissions. The sample for this study comprised all the S&P 500 firms required by the Environmental Protection Agency to annually report their toxic emissions to the Toxic Release Inventory. Data were collected for a 6-year period from 2006 to 2011. We used a panel data regression and employed propensity score matching to correct for potential endogeneity problems. (shrink)

pThrough the form of a letter, I engage my mentor, Jorge J. E. Gracia, in his own biographical articulation of life. While the letter was not included in the volume for which it was originally written, it was read to Gracia before he passed, and I could not be more honored. In the end, that is all that really matters. In the words that follow I take a moment to reflect on Jorge’s life and work as I process (...) his passing./p. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In a recent paper published in this journal, Thomas S. Petersen makes a qualified defense of what he calls ‘the Claim from Adoption’, according to which, ‘instead of expending resources on bringing new children [in developed countries] into the world using reproductive technology and caring for these children, we ought to devote these resources to the adoption and care of existing destitute children’. My purpose in this paper is not to discuss Petersen’s argument in favor of that claim. Rather, (...) I want to show that, even if the Claim from Adoption might be, other things being equal, true, it is not true all things considered. What is, all things considered, true is a much more complex set of statements, including a general prima facie obligation to adopt, as well as an obligation by the state of developed countries to discourage procreation and promote adoption of destitute children. (shrink)

Consensual homicide remains a crime in jurisdictions where active voluntary euthanasia has been legalized. At the same time, both jurisdictions, in which euthanasia is legal and those in which it is not, recognize that all patients (whether severely ill or not) have the right to refuse or withdraw medical treatment (including life-saving treatment). In this paper, I focus on the tensions between these three norms (the permission of active euthanasia, the permission to reject life-saving treatment, and the prohibition of consensual (...) homicide), assuming a justification of euthanasia based on the right to (personal) autonomy. I argue that the best way to provide a coherent account of these norms is to claim that patients have two distinct rights: the right to autonomy and the right to bodily integrity. This solution has some relevant implications for the discussion of the legalization of active euthanasia. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss exploitative transactions in bioethics. Examples of this kind of transactions allegedly include, among others, commercial surrogacy, organ selling, and research with human subjects in developing countries. The most problematic kind of exploitation is what Allan Wertheimer calls “mutually advantageous exploitation:” the weak party’s consent for the transaction is an effective and rational consent. Moreover, W does not suffer any harm by the transaction; on the contrary, the transaction benefits W. My aim in this paper is (...) twofold. From the perspective of individual ethics, I offer a model to understand the nature of the wrongfulness of the strong party’s action. And from the perspective of legal ethics, I suggest some reasons to believe that the prohibition of beneficial exploitative contracts is problematic and can only be justified in very exceptional cases. (shrink)

According to the evidence-relative view of liability to defensive harm, a person is so liable if and only if she acts in a way that provides sufficient evidence to justify a (putative) victim’s belief that the person poses a threat of unjust harm, which may or may not be the case. Bas van der Vossen defends this position by analyzing, in relation to a version of Frank Jackson’s famous drug example, a case in which a putative murderer is killed by (...) a putative victim. Van der Vossen submits that the putative murderer is liable to be killed, which is a verdict that can be accommodated only by the evidence-relative view. We argue that Van der Vossen’s attempt to ground the evidence-relative view of liability to defensive harm fails. We also argue that this notion should be construed in fact-relative terms. This, however, does not mean that the notion of permissibility should necessarily also be understood in such a way in all possible cases. So, we explore whether the evidence-relative view of permissibility may be used in some contexts. (shrink)

This paper seeks to highlight the French philosopher Michel Foucault's contributions regarding his analysis of power. In this sense, the text proposes a conceptual transition around the ideas that could have interested the author within a digital context, integrating some notes and examples from the 2019 Chilean mobilizations.The article has an initial section that exposes genealogy as a way of approaching social reality. Then, it shows the social behaviors anticipation possibilities and their relationship with the information available on the web. (...) Later, it renders an account of the algorithmic governmentality notion as a key to reading it in both normative structure and a political possibility to final state reflections. (shrink)

La pregunta que exploro en este trabajo es si la injusticia social puede socavar la autoridad moral de la sociedad para castigar al que delinque. La respuesta a esta pregunta depende esencialmente de cuál sea la teoría justificatoria del castigo penal de la que se parte. Analizo diversas teorías de la pena, entre ellas la teoría consensual de Carlos Nino. Mi objetivo es explorar de qué modo las diferentes teorías de la pena enfrentan el desafío que plantea la pregunta y (...) extraer algunas conclusiones tentativas de ese recorrido. The question I address in this paper is whether social injustice can undermine the moral authority of society to punish criminals. The answer to this question crucially depends on the underlying justificatory theory of punishment. I consider several theories, among them the consensual theory proposed by Carlos Nino. My aim is to explore how different theories of punishment address the challenge and to draw some tentative conclusions. (shrink)

Dentro del Humanismo Cristiano se da un concepto preciso de lo que sea la naturaleza humana. El hombre es una unidad intrínseca cuerpo-espíritu; por ello es un ser abierto a todo tipo de realidad, tanto material como espiritual o divina. Ha de construir su propia vida en vista de esta realidad si quiere salvarse individualmente y como especie. Actúa de acuerdo al modelo de vida que escoje y al fin que desea alcanzar. Los modelos de sociedad que construye, las instituciones (...) y normas por las que se rigen las diferentes sociedades responden a ese modelo de vida elegido. Por ello, B. Arias Montano y X. Zubiri, al coincidir en el mismo concepto de hombre, coinciden también en una explicación antropológica y filosófica de los actos humanos y los diferentes modelos de sociedad aparecidos a lo largo de la historia. (shrink)

This book offers a first rate selection of academic articles on Latin American bioethics. It covers different issues, such as vulnerability, abortion, biomedical research with human subjects, environment, exploitation, commodification, reproductive medicine, among others. Latin American bioethics has been, to an important extent, parochial and unable to meet stringent international standards of rational philosophical discussion. The new generations of bioethicists are changing this situation, and this book demonstrates that change. All articles are written from the perspective of Latin American scholars (...) from several disciplines such as philosophy and law. Working with the tools of analytical philosophy and jurisprudence, this book defends views with rational argument, and opening for pluralistic discussion. (shrink)

The problem of nonideal theory has been widely discussed in political philosophy in recent times. The problem has received much less attention, however, at the level of individual morality. Since the real world is a nonideal one, the problem is extremely relevant, if moral theory is to guide our action as moral agents. My purpose in this paper is mainly conceptual. I first clarify the distinction between different kinds of nonideal situation (natural accidents or limitations and partial compliance with morality) (...) and how different moral theories face those different kinds of imperfections. Secondly, I try to show that the distinction between the two main sources of imperfection is less straightforward and more complex than might be expected. Finally, I suggest that the role of partial compliance in nonideal moral theory is much more modest and difficult to defend than we might at first think. (shrink)

Este texto se recomprende la noción escolástica de verdad como adecuatio intellectus et rei a la luz de la la interpretación heideggeriana como ¿develación¿. Para ello se siguen tres momentos al hilo de tres preguntas: ¿en qué consiste esta adecuación?, ¿en qué sentido el intelecto y la cosa pensda se parecen? y ¿cuál es la esencia de la verdad?

El presente artículo analiza la concepción de la metodología científica expresada porAdam Smith en su historia de la astronomía, algo importante para comprender el resto de su obra. Losestudiosos de este tema se han centrado en su mayor parte en la influencia de Newton y Hume sobreSmith, surgiendo una concepción en la que la dimensión epistemológica y la estética se relacionande una manera tensa. El autor identifica nuevas fuentes, de naturaleza estética, que se integran eneste debate y ayudan a aclararlo: (...) Addison, Crousaz, Hutcheson, Berkeley y Diderot, cuya obra Smithconoció y apreció. A partir de ahí llega a la conclusión de que Smith puso en práctica una metodologíarica y compleja en la que los elementos epistemológicos y culturales se relacionaron de una manera notensa ni excluyente, sino armónica e incluyente. (shrink)

This article describes and analyzes the process of institutionalizing studies on science, technology, and society in Cuba, and the social and academic circumstances in which these studies are implemented there. The authors give a brief account of how science and technology have evolved in Cuba over the last four decades. The authors argue that the promotion of science and technological innovation in Cuba has purposely taken the form of social innovation. The authors offer our view of how the changes and (...) demands on science, technology, and education can take advantage of the approaches and proposals of STS studies. The authors consider the traditions of thought that have influenced Cuban culture and construct a specific conceptual framework through which contemporary developments in STS are assimilated. Finally, on the basis of the above analysis, the authors describe experiences of the institutionalization of STS and their underlying objectives. (shrink)

Si bien la doctrina civil ha destinado grandes esfuerzos a analizar la buena fe contractual y sus alcances, pocos de ellos ofrecen un fundamento filosófico-jurídico a su inclusión en la ejecución de los contratos. Este artículo propone fundar dicha noción con ayuda de las herramientas conceptuales de la Filosofía del Derecho de Hegel. Se la calificará como un dispositivo jurídico que incorpora al contrato el contenido normativo que la voluntad libre genera en los diferentes momentos de su desarrollo. Gracias a (...) la buena fe el contrato podrá contar como un instrumento adecuado en la esfera de lo que Hegel llama eticidad. En este sentido, el trabajo propone asumir a la buena fe como el mecanismo aglutinador del contenido normativo del contrato. Por una parte, asimilará las estipulaciones expresadas por las partes –qua persona y sujeto– en las esferas de los llamados derecho abstracto y moralidad (buena fe interna). Por la otra, incorporará el conjunto de actitudes o prácticas normativas de los miembros de una sociedad –qua agentes de mercado– propios de la eticidad (buena fe externa). En consecuencia, el contrato tiene un doble nivel de ajuste normativo. Uno relativo a qué prestación se debe y otro relativo a cómo debe ser satisfecha esa prestación. De este modo, este artículo no asume que la buena fe pueda generar para las partes obligaciones más allá de lo estipulado en el contrato, pues tiene una función adverbial. (shrink)

A partir de la modernidad el hombre busca la seguridad en la vida, y la forma filosófica de ello es la posesión de la verdad a través de la razón. Y esta búsqueda de seguridad a través de la razón se acompaña de una voluntad de dominio y poder sobre las cosas, con la razón las desciframos para luego dominarlas. Pero antes de que lo podamos hacer, las cosas se nos dan, nos deben ser dadas. Es el “estar-en-el-mundo” de Heidegger. (...) Hay algo antes de la razón misma, hay el existir mismo. Y una inteligencia que es momento de dicho existir. Inteligencia que es al mismo tiempo inteligir y hacer. En el hacer se la juega la existencia, Y esto es una praxis. La praxis se da en un ethos, a través de lo cual toda acción es finalmente ética. Y, al abrirse esta dimensión, nos encontramos con la realidad de Dios como articulador final y como culmen del proceso que partió de la búsqueda de seguridad y finalizó en el descubrimiento de Dios como lo único seguro, como la única certeza. (shrink)

BackgroundCognitive Behavioral Therapy is delivered in most of the early intervention services for psychosis in different countries around the world. This approach has been demonstrated to be effective in decreasing or at least delaying the onset of psychosis. However, none of them directly affect the comorbidity of these types of patients that is often the main cause of distress and dysfunctionality. The Unified Protocol for the Transdiagnostic Treatment of Emotional Disorders is a psychological intervention that combines cognitive-behavioral and third-generation techniques (...) that address emotional dysregulation as an underlying mechanism that these disorders have in common. The application of this intervention could improve the comorbid emotional symptoms of these patients.Materials and methodsThe study is a randomized controlled trial in which one group receives immediate UP plus standard intervention and the other is placed on a waiting list to receive UP 7 months later, in addition to standard care in one of our early psychosis programs. The sample will be 42 patients with UHR for psychosis with comorbid emotional symptoms. The assessment is performed at baseline, at the end of treatment, and at 3-months’ follow-up, and includes: general psychopathology, anxiety and depression, positive and negative emotions, emotional dysregulation, personality, functionality, quality of life, cognitive distortions, insight, and satisfaction with the UP intervention.DiscussionThis will be the first study of the efficacy, acceptability, and viability of the UP in a sample of young adults with UHR. The results of this study may have clinical implications, contributing to improving the model of care for young people who consult for underlying psychotic, anxiety, and/or depressive symptoms that can lead to high distress and dysfunctionality.Clinical trial registration[https://clinicaltrials.gov/], identifier [NCT04929938]. (shrink)

Actualmente se estudia la compleja relación existente entre el campo y la ciudad. Sin embargo, campo y ciudad son, en realidad, modos de vida urbanos. Esto se puede inferir a partir de unas palabras de Vico, concretándose en el estudio de los mitos urbanos. De ahí se obtiene que lo que en realidad se contrapone es la vida selvática a la vida urbana El hombre como ser urbano es el ser que posee palabra, a la vez que el ser que (...) tiene historia. Contemplando esto a la luz del modelo viquiano comprendemos que nos acecha la barbarie de la razón. (shrink)